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 How effective are government policies in promoting the
 diffusion of information technology? Kenneth Kraemer,
 Vijay Gurbaxani, andJohn Leslie King studied the
 impact of industrial policies in nine Asia-Pacific
 nations andfound that such efforts did not have the
 significant direct effects on the diffusion of computer
 technology that might have been expected. While some
 governmentfiscal and trade policies didfacilitate
 increases in computing expenditures, the authors found
 that the level of economic development was a more
 important predictor. Whateverpolicies are adopted
 should take into consideration the status of the coun-
 try's economy.
 The last 20 years have seen the emergence of several
 Asia-Pacific countries as significant economic powers.
 Notable in the accomplishments of these countries are
 consistent and rapid increases in the level of industrial-
 ization, particularly in high-technology industries and in
 the application of high technology to traditional indus-
 tries (Amsden, 1989). The theoretical links between
 technical innovation, industrialization, and economic
 growth have been established for many years, dating at
 least from Schumpeter (1935), and argued forcefully
 ever since (Salter, 1960; Schmookler, 1972; David,
 1975). The question of what gives rise to technological
 innovation, and thence economic growth, has been
 widely debated. Although the verdict is not yet in on
 the complete package of factors involved, it is clear that
 simple neoclassical economic theories of factor price
 differentials are insufficient to explain innovation, and
 that social institutions play key roles (Rosenberg, 1982).
 A pressing public policy question, particularly since
 the advent of intense international economic competi-
 tion from Asian countries in the 1980s, has been
 whether the institutions of government play a necessary
 and special role in industrial development and techno-
 logical innovation. This question has been debated at
 length since the early 1970s (Pavitt, 1971). The debate
 has grown more heated in recent years, with prominent
 economists arguing for and against government involve-
 ment and the creation of an industrial policy (Thurow,
 1984; Stiglitz, 1987). It has also received increased
 attention in theoretical and empirical research by vari-
 ous scholars (Amendola and Gaffard, 1988; Dosi et al.,
 1988; Freeman, 1987). In particular, empirical studies of
 the remarkable progress of Japan and other Pacific Rim
 countries have cited government policy as a major fac-
 tor in that success (Johnson, 1982; Freeman, 1987;
 Amsden, 1989). These arguments are compelling, but
 much remains to be done before the empirical case
 incontrovertibly linking industrial policy to economic
 growth is established.
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 This article focuses on the question of economic develop-
 ment, government policy, and technological innovation in a
 particular technological domain-computing technology-
 and in a particular region-the Asia-Pacific region. We chose
 computing technology as our focus because the effective use
 of this technology has been identified as an important com-
 ponent of industrial growth, and the ability to produce and
 use computer-related products has been seen as essential for
 any well-developed economy (Flamm, 1987; Land, 1990).
 The belief in the importance of proficiency in computer pro-
 duction and use is sufficiently strong to have prompted
 numerous countries to develop national computer plans as
 aids in national economic development (Kaul, 1987;
 Gurbaxani, et al. 1990; Odedra, 1990). It is worth noting that
 many of the national computer plans make specific reference
 to the linkage between the promotion of computing and eco-
 nomic growth. For example, Cherng and Lin (1990) describe
 Taiwan's (ROC) rationale as follows:
 Due to the emergence of the information revolu-
 tion and the increasing competition in the world
 market, the ROC government has become aware
 that in order to assure national survival and
 development, the country must enhance competi-
 tiveness by resorting to the promotion of new
 information technology, enhancement of the gov-
 ernment's efficiency and the increase of industrial
 productivity.
 Accordingly, in its "10 year Development Plan for
 Taiwan's Economy," formulated in 1981, the ROC
 government specifically designated the informa-
 tion industry as a "strategic" one. In order to
 promote the development of the industry, the
 government.. .formulated the "Sectoral Develop-
 ment Plan for the Information Industry (1980-
 1989)," in which is mapped out the project for
 computerizing the operations of government
 agencies and public and private enterprises, so as
 to promote the application of computers, expand
 the domestic computer market, and assist the
 development of the local information industry.
 We selected the Asia-Pacific region as a locus for our
 study because it provides an excellent array of examples with
 respect to both economic development and government poli-
 cy towards computing diffusion. The region has highly
 developed economies, newly industrializing economies, and
 developing economies. It also has countries with aggressive
 government policies for the development of computing tech-
 nology and countries with a policy of nonintervention in this
 technical realm.
 Two quantitative indicators highlight the growing impor-
 tance of the Asia-Pacific region. The first is the absolute size
 of the computing market in the region, which was calculated
 at $79 billion (U.S. dollars) in 1989, or nearly 30 percent of
 the world market, with Europe at $94 billion and the United
 States at $111 billion (McKinsey and Company, 1990).1
 Moreover, the Asia-Pacific region is the fastest growing of
 these three regions, with a 30 percent growth in the market
 between 1985 and 1989 compared to 20 percent growth for
 Europe and 5 percent for North America (McKinsey and
 Company, 1990). Given the magnitude of Asia-Pacific growth
 in computing, it is likely that government has been a major
 contributor, both as a direct result of its spending for govern-
 ment computerization programs (including infrastructure) and
 its stimulation of private-sector computerization through tariff,
 tax, training, subsidy, and related policy interventions.
 Our analytic approach in this article is to review the argu-
 ments for and against such government interventions and to
 examine aggregate data for any initial evidence that such
 interventions do play a role in the diffusion of computing
 technology. The theoretical arguments in favor of govern-
 ment intervention to promote computing are shown to have
 strong face validity. However, based on a preliminary empir-
 ical analysis using a newly aggregated database on economic
 growth and computing expenditures in nine Asia-Pacific
 countries, we conclude that empirical support for their effica-
 cy at the aggregate level is lacking. Economic development
 and investment in computing technology are shown to be
 associated regardless of government policy. Simply put, such
 investments appear to be related more to the state of eco-
 nomic development in a country than to government policy
 toward computing. These results raise interesting questions
 about the rationale for, and real efficacy of, national comput-
 er plans.
 Should Governments Intervene?
 Opponents of government intervention in the production
 and use of computing technology usually argue from neoclas-
 sical economic philosophy that laissez-innover, the free spirit
 of innovation in the private sphere, is a direct relation to lais-
 sez-faire of the market (Kraemer and King, 1978). Minimal
 public-goods infrastructure might be required to build a base
 for private action, but direct governmental intervention in the
 processes of innovation, they hold, distorts the market for
 Table 1
 Classification of Countries by Development Status
 Country GDP Per Capita Human Development
 1987 (dollars) Index (1990)
 Developed countries
 Australia 11,000 .978
 New Zealand 7,750 .966
 Newly industrialized
 countries
 Hong Kong 8,070 .936
 Singapore 7,940 .899
 South Korea 2,690 .903
 Taiwan 5,075 *
 Developing countries
 Indonesia 450 .591
 Malaysia 1,810 .800
 Philippines 590 .714
 Source: UNDP (1990)
 * The United Nations does not carry statistics for the Republic of
 China (Taiwan).
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 State of Economic Development
 The countries in our data set can be categorized into three classifications based on the state of their economic and
 social development (Table 1). The source for these data (excluding Taiwan) was the United Nations Development
 Program (UNDP) 1990.
 We used two measures as the basis for classifying the countries. The first, which is the measure most commonly used by
 economists and others, is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The second, which is new, is the Human Development
 Index created by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1990). This index is a composite measure, ranging
 from zero to one, which includes three elements of a decent living standard: longevity (life expectancy at birth), knowledge
 (adult literacy), and income (logarithm of real GDP per capita). This index was developed because economic growth per se
 does not translate into human development in all societies. Some countries have achieved high levels of human develop-
 ment at modest levels of per capita income. Others have failed to translate their high income levels and rapid economic
 growth into commensurate levels of human development We believe that the two measures provide a good basis for classi-
 fying the development status of countries because, taken together, they reflect both the economic and social aspects of a
 country.
 Government Policy Toward Computing
 In addition to their development status, the countries studied can be characterized in terns of government policy
 toward computing. The sources for these characterizations are the national plans of the countries, papers written on the
 subject by country experts, and our own continuing field investigations in each country. Table 2 describes the countries
 in terms of whether they: (1) developed an explicit national plan for computing, (2) appointed a plan coordinator, (3)
 focused on production and/or use, and (4) targeted promotion of use on the public and/or the private sector.
 Computing Diffusion
 We quantified the aggregate level of computing diffusion through a surrogate measure: total computing expenditures.
 This is a widely used measure in studies of computing growth (Gurbaxani and Mendelson, 1987, 199). Because it is diffi-
 cult to create accurate measures of "quantities" of computing, it becomes necessary to use a measurable proxy variable
 that is highly correlated with the "true" variable. Although the use of total computing expenditures has limitations as a
 diffusion measure-for example, one cannot tell how computers are used or how broadly or narrowly they are diffused in
 the economy-we believe that the measure is useful for this preliminary investigation.
 new ideas and thwarts or misdirects private initiative, thereby
 damping the underlying engines of creativity that produce
 innovation in the long run (Stiglitz, 1987). There is also
 ample evidence that too much of the wrong kinds of govern-
 ment intervention in private economic life can have disas-
 trous consequences for both technological innovation and
 economic growth (North, 1988).
 Proponents of government policies that support both
 domestic production and use of computing technology
 extend the connection between social investments in public
 goods such as basic research and physical infrastructure, to
 the eventual exploitation of technological innovations
 enabled or caused by such social investments. Government's
 role is to provide whatever infrastructure is necessary to get
 economic development started and to maintain it after it is
 going. This "priming-the-pump" argument is well-established
 in the literature on economic development (Todaro, 1989).
 The key discriminator between the arguments against and
 for intervention is this: how does one define the critical
 infrastructure requiring government involvement? The con-
 servative view described above holds that only those activi-
 ties, products, and services that are pure public goods can be
 counted as legitimate infrastructure for government attention.
 Basically, they argue that government involvement must end
 where the markets begin. Proponents of intervention stretch
 the concept of infrastructure to include institutional interven-
 tions of many kinds, including those in the markets them-
 selves. This "regulatory" view of economic growth is
 expounded well in Boyer's (1988) articulation of the "regime
 of accumulation," which sets the context within which eco-
 nomic growth might proceed. In this view, no intervention is
 excluded a priori. The question is not what is theoretically
 appropriate, but what is practically required given specific cir-
 cumstances.
 The arguments in favor of and against intervention are
 backed with case-specific empirical evidence. Opponents
 have long pointed out the drastic consequences of govern-
 ment involvement which can throttle both technological inno-
 vation and economic development (von Hayek, 1945). The
 serious problems seen in radical intervention create a "slip-
 pery-slope" argument against significant interventions of any
 kind. In much the same way, however, proponents point to
 the presence of government policy and contemporaneous
 economic growth in certain countries, arguing that the former
 causes, or at least facilitates, the latter. Japan's industrial poli-
 cies are usually cited as the premier examples, but the nation-
 al industrial plans of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are
 held up as examples of ways in which government policy can
 dramatically help economic growth (Johnson, 1982; Amsden,
 1989). This specific argument is made forcefully in the case
 of computing technology by Flamm (1987) and by Matley and
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 Table 2
 Summary of Government Policy Toward Computing, Circa 1988a
 Central Coordinator Focus of Plan Target of Use
 Explicit Plan Public Private
 Country for Computing Production Use Production Use Sector Sector
 Australiab Yes Yes No Yes No No No
 New Zealand No No No No No No No
 Hong Kong No No Government No Yes Yes No
 sector only
 Singapore Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
 South Korea Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Taiwan Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Indonesia No No Government No No No No
 sector only
 Malaysia No No Government No Yes Yes No
 sector only
 Philippines No No Government No Yes Yes No
 sector only
 a The status of several countries has changed since 1988. For example, Hong Kong adopted a plan for government computer use in 1990,
 and Malaysia created a central coordinator for production and use in 1990. However, these actions occurred beyond the period of our data
 set, and, therefore, were not included in Table 2.
 b At first glance, Australia should be included in the set of countries with a national computer plan. However, it is not included because
 Australia's national policy was only announced in September 1987 and focused mainly on computer production rather than use. Therefore,
 it would have had little or no effect on the data used in this study.
 McDannold (1987), and for better or worse, the argument has
 strong support in countries that wish to emulate Japan's great
 economic surge forward.
 In this article, we address three empirical questions that
 provide a preliminary assessment of the relation between
 government computing policies and their consequences.
 These questions are: Do the newly industrialized countries
 spend proportionately more for computing than developed or
 developing countries? Do they have higher rates of spending
 growth than do developed countries? Do they have govern-
 ment policies that promote spending more and faster?
 Table 3
 Compound Annual Growth Rates of
 Computing Expenditures for Each Country
 Country Hardware Software Services Total
 Australia 14.2 16.5 6.4 11.9
 New Zealanda 17.8 24.2 20.8 19.4
 Hong Kong 6.5 12.0 10.9 7.8
 South Korea 7.9 36.1 22.0 10.8
 Taiwan 9.6 21.1 10.8 10.8
 Singaporeb -0.9* 13.6 11.4 3.8
 Indonesia -0.6* 16.9 7.0 2.2
 Malaysia -4.4* 14.1 5.6 0.5*
 Philippines 3.5 27.5 3.7* 5.4
 a New Zealand's overall growth rate is exaggerated by rapid
 growth in the period 1984 to 1986, when the sales tax on com-
 puter hardware was reduced, foreign exchange controls were
 lifted, and tariffs reduced.
 b Singapore's growth rate is depressed by the major recession it
 experienced during 1985 to 1986.
 c The coefficients are not statistically significant at the 95 percent
 level.
 Preliminary Empirical Investigation
 The relationship between interventions and their conse-
 quences is best revealed by careful, longitudinal study that
 links together specific policies and actions with particular
 results. Such study is badly needed and in some limited
 instances has begun, but to date the best assessments are lim-
 ited to cross-sectional evaluations of the correspondence
 between policies and economic measures of computer-related
 activity in given countries (Gurbaxani et al., 1990; Odedra,
 1990).
 This analysis examines the relationship between three ele-
 ments: economic development, government policy, and
 computing diffusion. It uses data from nine Asia-Pacific
 countries for the period from 1983 through 1988. The three
 elements of the general framework are shown in Figure 1 and
 are described in the grey box on page 148. The data being
 analyzed is described in the grey box on page 150.
 Based on the data in Table 2, we concluded that three
 countries had instituted explicit government plans to promote
 computing production and/or use: Singapore, South Korea,
 and Taiwan.'
 Singapore's national computer plan (Gurbaxani et al.,
 1991) is aimed at developing a local software and services
 industry through pilot programs in the public sector and at
 intensive promotion of computing adoption and use in both
 the public and private sectors. The plan also provides for
 strong educational programs in computer science, information
 systems, and computer use in order to build a base of needed
 computer professionals and computer users. Singapore has a
 single central industry coordinator with exceptional control-
 the National Computer Board (NCB). The NCB works with
 other government agencies to develop a local software and
 services industry and to attract multinational computer firms
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 We used data on aggregate spending in constant 1982 U.S. dollars for three major categories of computing budgets-
 hardware, outside software, and services (excluding telecommunications)-for the years 1983 to 1988 to examine the level
 of computerization and the rate of diffusion of the technology in each of the countries studied. The trends in computing
 expenditures in these countries are presented and compared with what other studies have indicated are the corresponding
 trends in the United States.
 We believe that the data reasonably reflect overall trends and the relative state of computing diffusion among coun-
 tries. There is no standard set of systematically collected statistics on computing expenditures across countries. Reliable
 data on information-technology spending is difficult to obtain due to discrepancies among the data collection instruments
 used and the time frames sampled. However, we have confidence in our data because they were assembled from different
 data sets that allow triangulation. The data used in this analysis were obtained from various sources: published reports of
 the International Data Corporation, Dataquest, and Infocorp, etc.; government statistics; and interviews with marketing
 experts at major computer manufacturers. Although the data were obtained from a variety of sources, we believe that the
 data set is the best available for the Asia-Pacific region. These data should be interpreted as indicative of broad trends
 rather than as point estimates of the level and growth rates of computing in each country.
 The main purpose of the empirical analysis is to summarize the aggregate growth trends in the various computing cate-
 gories and to determine their fit with established economic models of computing growth (Gurbaxani and Mendelson,
 1987). These models formally develop the rationale for growth patterns. Specifically, they note that price trends in com-
 puting display an exponential decline, and that when the demand for computing is of constant price elasticity, then the
 pattern of growth is an exponential increase in spending over time. Empirical studies have shown that in the United
 States the observed growth pattern of information systems is consistent with the predicted pattern (Gurbaxani and
 Mendelson, 1990). The resulting specification for each of the categories of computing expenditures is a regression of the
 logarithm of the annual expenditure in the given category against time. The details of the analysis are described in a tech-
 nical appendix (available from the authors), and the results of the empirical analyses are summarized in Table 3.
 Our data, which are shown in Table 3, are lower than those of the McKinsey report because: (1) Japan was not
 included in our data set, and (2) our figures were for 1987 but expressed in 1982 dollars, whereas the McKinsey figures
 were for 1989 and expressed in 1989 dollars.
 to produce locally for export. The NCB houses the computer
 industry associations and computer societies, coordinates
 education and training by all public institutions, promotes
 computing careers, and generally promotes computing use
 within the country. The NCB is the provider of computing
 applications and services for all government agencies, and
 recently it has taken the lead in developing systems that link
 the public and private sectors.
 Although South Korea has emphasized the electronics
 industry since the 1960s, it first targeted the computing indus-
 try for development as part of its fifth Five-Year Economic
 Development Plan, 1982-87 (Amsden, 1989; Matley and
 McDannold, 1987). The plan focused on the creation of a
 local computer manufacturing industry, particularly in the
 areas of mini- and micro-computers, and the production of
 software to support industry with applications. Industry coor-
 dination is provided by two main institutions, although there
 are many other institutional actors as well. The Ministry of
 Trade and Industry coordinates research and development in
 Figure 1
 General Framework
 State of Government Computing
 Economic B Computing s Diffusion
 Development Policy
 the computer industry, including the education and training
 of computer scientists and computer engineers. The National
 Computerization Board coordinates computer use in all sec-
 tors of the economy and has heavily targeted both the public
 and private sectors for the promotion of computing use.
 Taiwan's national plan (Cherng and Lin, 1990) is aimed at
 both production and use. Production of computer technolo-
 gy is oriented towards niche markets (personal computers,
 monitors, PC motherboards) and components for multination-
 al computer vendors. The plan also is aimed at increasing
 the number of computer professionals and information sys-
 tems users in order to provide sufficient skilled labor for
 effective domestic production and use of the technology.
 Industry coordination is provided by the Institute for
 Information Industry, which was created in 1979. The insti-
 tute promotes the development of the local computer indus-
 try by training the high-level manpower needed by the indus-
 try, conducting research and development, introducing
 advanced techniques, providing capital for the industry, and
 giving preference to locally made computers in government
 procurements. The institute promotes the use of computing
 in both the public and the private sectors through the devel-
 opment of plans for computerization, the development of
 application software, the improvement of government com-
 puter centers and staff, the education and training of comput-
 er professionals and computer users, and the promotion of
 computing within the population as a whole.
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 Table 4
 Income Levels and Computing Expenditures
 (Excluding Telecommunications) by Country, 1987
 GDP Computing
 Per-Capita Expenditure
 Country (1987 US dollars) as Percentage
 of GDP
 Australia 11,100 2.8
 New Zealand 7,750 2.3
 Hong Kong 8,070 1.1
 South Korea 2,690 0.6
 Taiwan 4,133 0.6
 Singapore 7,940 1.3
 Indonesia 450 0.2
 Malaysia 1,810 0.7
 Philippines 590 0.2
 United States 18,530 2.2
 Results
 The Pattern of Computing Growth
 Our first major finding was that, overall, the data were
 well described by an exponential growth model.2 The aver-
 age growth rate for total computing expenditures was 8.1
 percent. New Zealand had the highest annual rate at 19.4
 percent and Malaysia, the lowest at 0.5 percent. (Table 3)
 The exponential model further held for all categories of
 computing expenditures-hardware (excluding telecommuni-
 cations), outside software and services. Hardware expendi-
 tures in the region grew at an average annual rate of 7.6 per-
 cent during the period 1983 to 1988, although the growth rate
 varied from 3.5 percent for the Philippines to 17.8 percent for
 New Zealand. The average growth rate for software expendi-
 tures was 20.2 percent, and ranged from 12.0 percent for
 Hong Kong to 36.1 percent for South Korea. For services
 expenditures, the average growth rate was 10.6 percent, and
 ranged from 3.7 percent for the Philippines to 22.0 percent
 for South Korea. (Table 3)
 Total computing expenditures for all countries, other than
 Indonesia and Malaysia, displayed excellent fits. In these
 countries, all coefficient estimates were statistically significant
 at the 95 percent level. Software expenditures fit the model
 in all countries without exception. Services expenditures fit
 well for all countries except the Philippines. The trends in
 hardware expenditures were consistent with the model in all
 countries except Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, which
 experienced recessions in the period of analysis. Like most
 capital goods, investments in hardware decreased consider-
 ably during a recession.
 This finding-that the overall pattern of growth in the
 Asia-Pacific region is exponential-is significant. Basically, it
 says that computing expenditures in the region are not highly
 erratic over time; rather they follow a pattern of more or less
 steady growth. This pattern in the Asia-Pacific region corre-
 sponds to Gurbaxani and Mendelson's (1987, 1991) finding in
 the United States that expenditure growth on computing has
 been exponential since the early 1970s. The primary alterna-
 tive pattern is the commonly used S curve, or logistic curve,
 in which expenditures start off slowly, then rise quickly dur-
 ing a takeoff period, and eventually flatten out at some eqiii-
 librium level. This curve has not worked well as a pattern for
 describing diffusion in the IT sector in the United States.
 Another alternative is the price-adjusted diffusion pattern, in
 which the initial process of computing budget growth is S
 shaped, but a steady-state growth period emerges where
 computing prices decline and computing budgets continue to
 grow. This pattern appeared to hold until the early 1970s,
 but then was displaced by the exponential pattern
 (Gurbaxani and Mendelson, 1990).
 Moreover, this finding of "steady growth" suggests that
 government computing policy might not make a difference in
 overall spending. If government policy made a difference,
 we would have expected to see a shift in the spending pat-
 tern after the introduction of such policy. No such pattern is
 present in the data for the three countries that adopted
 national computer plans in the early 1980s (Singapore, South
 Korea, and Taiwan). Although it might be argued that the
 data simply are not refined enough to show the influence of
 government policy, the general correspondence of the data
 with the U.S. pattern, where there is no national computer
 plan, calls this argument into question.
 The Influence of Economic Development
 Our second major finding is that both the level and the
 growth rate of computing expenditures correspond directly to
 the level of economic development in a country, regardless of
 whether it is developed, newly industrialized, or developing.
 By level of computing expenditures, we mean the proportion
 of the overall economy spent for computing, i.e., computing
 expenditures taken as a percent of GDP. Table 4 shows that
 spending levels correspond to development status, with the
 developed countries of Australia and New Zealand highest
 and the developing countries of the Philippines and
 Indonesia lowest. Malaysia is the only country that does not
 fit the pattern, probably because it is really between the
 Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC) and the developing
 countries in terms of development status. Thus, its spending
 level is more characteristic of the NICs than the other devel-
 oping countries.
 This pattern, in which total computing expenditures corre-
 spond directly to the level of economic development in a
 country, also held for the compound annual growth rate
 (Table 3). Two developed countries, Australia and New
 Zealand, had the highest annualized growth rates of 11.9 per-
 cent and 19.4 percent respectively.3 The newly industrialized
 countries showed the next highest annualized growth rates, at
 3.8 percent for Singapore, 7.8 percent for Hong Kong, and
 10.8 percent for Taiwan and South Korea. Finally, the devel-
 oping countries experienced a lower growth rate with
 Malaysia at 0.5 percent, Indonesia at 2.2 percent, and the
 Philippines at 5.4 percent.
 This finding has important implications because it fails to
 support the argument that developed countries would show
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 Table 5
 Average Growth in GDP and Computing
 Expenditures by Country, 1984-1988
 Average GDP Average Computing
 Growth Expenditure Growth
 Country (Percent) (Percent)
 Australia 3.9 11.9
 New Zealand 1.8 19.4
 Hong Kong 8.2 7.8
 South Korea 10.6 10.8
 Taiwan 9.2 10.8
 Singapore 6.1 3.8
 Indonesia 5.0 2.2
 Malaysia 4.7 0.5
 Philippines 0.5 5.4
 Sources: International Monetary Fund (1990) for all countries
 except Taiwan; Asian Development Bank (1988) for Taiwan.
 high levels of computer technology penetration, but develop-
 ing countries would show high growth rates in computing
 investments as they attempted to catch up. In fact, the oppo-
 site is true. Developed countries are high in both the total
 level and rate of increase in spending for computing.
 Moreover, although computing expenditures in the NICs were
 growing at roughly the same rate as economic growth, in
 Australia and New Zealand computing expenditures far out-
 paced economic growth (Table 5).
 The above findings further reinforce the argument that a
 country's level of computing expenditure is strongly correlat-
 ed to its stage of economic development. Two factors may
 help explain this finding. One is that as economies develop,
 the bulk of the output tends to shift from agriculture to man-
 ufacturing to services. Computing applications are generally
 service oriented, with the heaviest users being the financial
 (i.e., banking, insurance), distribution (transportation, whole-
 sale, retail), and government sectors. Thus, computing use
 should be highest in service-dominated economies. Second,
 as economies develop to the point where unemployment
 decreases, wages begin to rise, increasing the gains from sub-
 stituting capital for labor. In other words, the potential
 returns on investment in computing are greater. Table 6 and
 Figures 2 and 3 show that the highest levels of computing
 expenditure are in the countries with high wages and where
 services make up the highest proportions of GDP.
 These two factors may explain the high levels of comput-
 ing expenditure in Australia and New Zealand compared to
 Hong Kong and Singapore, which have comparable per capi-
 ta incomes but much lower wage rates. They also add a
 stronger causal link between level of development and com-
 puting diffusion using economic factors of demand creation
 (the move to a services-dominated economy) and costs of
 substitutes (wage rates).
 Other factors associated with high levels of development
 include: high levels of education; reliable infrastructure in
 power, transportation and telecommunications; and a pool of
 managerial and technical expertise. All of these factors are
 necessary for the assimilation of a "network" technology such
 as computing. Also, the developed countries have (for the
 reasons detailed above) been using computers for a longer
 time than the NICs, and thus have developed a computing-
 specific infrastructure, including computer education pro-
 grams with qualified instructors, computer literate workers
 and managers, organizational experience with computing,
 and both intra- and inter-organizational networks. These fac-
 tors actually lower the cost and increase the productivity of
 new computing investment.
 The Influence of Government Policy
 What of the question of whether government intervention
 associates with computing investment and economic growth?
 To examine this question, we looked at the particular profiles
 of the countries with national computing plans, in the context
 of the other countries in the study.
 There is no clear evidence linking computing expenditures
 to the existence of a formal national computer plan. The
 three NICs with such plans had the following growth rates:
 South Korea, 10.8 percent; Taiwan, 10.8 percent; and
 Singapore, 3.8 percent.
 However, we found higher growth rates among the devel-
 oped countries and the one NIC without national computer
 plans: Australia, 11.9 percent; New Zealand, 19.4 percent;
 and Hong Kong, 7.8
 Leaving out the three developing countries, we found
 insufficient evidence to conclude a correlation between
 national computing plans and computing diffusion.
 However, this is not to say that policy does not matter.
 What it might indicate is that what matters most in terms of
 government policy is the range of policy decisions that affect
 the cost of labor versus the cost of computers. For example, if
 Table 6
 Services Orientation, Wage Rates, and Computing
 Expenditures as Percent of GDP, by Country
 Computing
 Percent Hourly Wage Expenditure
 Labor Force Rate in as Percentage
 in Services, Manufactring, of GDP,
 Country 1985-1987a 1987, U.S. dol11mb 1987
 Australia 77 9.20 2.8
 New Zealand 70 5.68 (clothing)C 2.3
 10.20 (pulp, paper)C
 Hong Kong 64 2.10 1.1
 South Korea 51 1.80 .6
 Taiwan 2.20 .6
 Singapore 73 2.40 1.3
 Indonesia 36 .2
 Malaysia 39 .7
 Philippines 46 .2
 a Source: UNDP (1990).
 b Source: World Economic Forum (1989), cited in Australian
 Government Industry Commission (1990, p. 57).
 c Source: New Zealand Department of Statistics (1989), cited in
 New Zealand Ministry of Commerce (1990, p. 14).
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 Figure 2
 Service Orientation and Computing Expenditures
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 a government drives down wage rates, it may discourage
 computing investment. The case of New Zealand shows how
 broader economic policies might affect the price of comput-
 ers and therefore the demand for computing. In October
 1983, the New Zealand government reduced the sales tax on
 computer hardware from 40 percent to 10 percent; in 1984,
 they removed foreign exchange controls and lowered tariffs.
 These moves greatly reduced the cost of all types of comput-
 ers and related equipment. Immediately, computing expendi-
 tures increased by 20.4 percent in 1984, 33.1 percent in 1985,
 and 34.7 percent in 1986. This satisfied the pent-up demand
 for computing until a new equilibrium was reached at the
 new relative prices. The growth rate leveled off in 1987 and
 1988 at around 7 percent.
 Government programs aimed directly at computing, espe-
 cially those for education and infrastructure (e.g., power,
 telecommunications), may have an effect on diffusion, but
 such an effect may be felt more slowly and is harder to quan-
 tify. Finally, if government substantially increases its own
 rate of expenditures on computing, this will obviously have
 an effect on total expenditures.
 Figure 3
 Wage Rates and Computing Expenditures
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 Policies most likely to cause a discreet sbift in
 spendingpatterns on computing technology
 appear to be those that significantly change
 the relative costs of computing or its substitutes.
 What this might suggest from a policy perspective is that
 government policy can have a short-term effect if policies
 substantially change the cost of the technology (e.g., through
 tax or tariff changes), but the computing promotion activities
 usually contained in a national computer plan (education,
 public awareness, infrastructure) will be more marginal in
 their effects. If that is the case, then policies must be imple-
 mented that conform to and support the broader economic
 trends driving computing diffusion. For example, it will be of
 little use to offer tax incentives for computing purchases at
 the same time as the currency is being devalued (thereby
 raising the cost of imported computers and lowering relative
 wage rates).
 Conclusion
 What can we conclude at this point? First, our study reaf-
 firms the presence of a relationship between economic devel-
 opment and investment in computing technology. The high-
 er the level of development the higher the level of computing
 expenditure in a country. Although this relationship has
 often been posited in the literature, the unambiguous nature
 of the results of this study provide solid empirical support for
 the proposition. Moreover, our analysis suggests specific
 variables as causal linkages between the level of economic
 development and computing diffusion. These variables
 include the demand for computing (affected by the move to a
 service-dominated economy in more developed countries),
 the cost of computer technology, and the cost of substitutes
 (i.e., wage rates).
 However, we must leave open the claim, neither support-
 ed nor contradicted, that investment in computing technology
 "leads" to economic growth. Jt is not possible, given our
 data, to demonstrate causality in the relationship, and we are
 not aware of any data or studies that do provide such demon-
 stration. Nevertheless, the weight of historical evidence is on
 the side of a causal relationship between investment in tech-
 nology and economic growth (Rosenberg, 1982). Our find-
 ings do not contradict this tradition; rather they support it
 indirectly via the associations found.
 Our findings regarding government policy are mixed.
 Policies most likely to cause a discreet shift in spending pat-
 terns on computing technology appear to be those that signif-
 icantly change the relative costs of computing or its substi-
 tutes. These are generally fiscal policies, such as sales taxes
 and tariff rates or depreciation allowance schedules. They
 may also be macroeconomic policies such as exchange-rate
 policy, controls on foreign exchange, or monetary policy.
 The New Zealand case clearly shows the degree to which
 computing expenditures can shift dramatically due to broad
 policy changes in these areas.
 Regarding national computer policies, the results are less
 clear. A comparison of the computer expenditures of the
 three countries with such policies to the three without them
 (not including developing countries), shows no evidence that
 the existence of national computer policies leads to increased
 spending overall. Thus, in terms of the data set used in this
 study, we cannot claim any such association.
 However, two points should be made as caveats to this
 conclusion. First, the national computer plans of South
 Korea, Taiwan, and to a lesser extent Singapore, were largely
 aimed at increasing production of computing products and
 services within those countries. It may be that such policies
 are more effective in promoting production than use of com-
 puters. Even Australia, a heavy user of computers,
 announced an Information Industries Strategy in 1987 that tar-
 gets production and exports of information technology as key
 goals.
 Still, raw data on production could be misleading as a
 measure of technology diffusion, especially in a case like
 Singapore, where a number of multinational computer com-
 panies manufacture products for export but transfer very little
 technology and generally do not carry out research and
 development. This production may provide jobs, investment,
 and export earnings to Singapore but is not in itself evidence
 of diffusion of computing within the country. And Australia's
 policies are driven as much by balance of trade problems as
 by technology concerns (Dedrick and Kraemer, 1991).
 The second point regarding national computer policies is
 that their effects may be more subtle than those of macroeco-
 nomic policy changes and may not be easily discernible in a
 measure such as total computing expenditures. As men-
 tioned before, the effects are likely to be felt more gradually
 over a longer period of time and thus would not cause a dis-
 creet shift that could be easily correlated to the introduction
 of the policy. Also, some of the initiatives generally included
 in a national computer policy (training, increased coordina-
 tion, and data sharing among government and research insti-
 tutions) may result in qualitative improvements in computer
 applications without much increase in computer spending.
 For example, training tax collectors in computer skills and
 improving data sharing with other agencies may improve the
 efficiency and effectiveness of tax collection without any
 need for new hardware or even purchased software (new
 programs might be written by existing staff and not show up
 in any market data).
 These two caveats do not contradict the broader findings
 of this study but rather suggest avenues for further, more
 fine-tuned research. As to the question of whether govern-
 ments should adopt policies to support production and use of
 computing, one answer is that many are doing so without
 waiting for empirical evidence to support the value of such
 actions. Even the developing countries are moving in this
 direction. The Philippines announced a National Information
 Technology Plan in 1989, and Malaysia and Indonesia are for-
 mulating such policies as well. Only New Zealand is moving
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 in the opposite direction, having dismantled its coordination
 apparatus for government computing and corporatized its
 government computing bureaus.
 On the other end of the scale, most of the developed
 countries (especially the European Community and Japan)
 have national strategies to promote information technology,
 while the United States mostly limits its computer policies to
 areas of military concern. The poor performance of the
 European "national champions" and the so-far limited output
 of Japan's Fifth Generation Computer Project also suggest lim-
 its to the value of government intervention.
 In contrast, the aggregate data from our empirical analysis
 show no negative relationship between computing growth
 and the kinds of intervention found in South Korea,
 Singapore, and Taiwan. In fact, controlling for the early
 spending surge in New Zealand and for the sharp recession
 in Singapore (1985-1986) which depressed demand across the
 economy, we find virtually no difference in performance
 between countries with national computer plans and those
 without. This suggests that if computer policies have any
 effect, it is likely to be more qualitative than quantitative and
 more long term than immediate. Also, even if government
 intervention can be shown convincingly to pay off in some
 cases, it is doubtful that the same policies would work well
 for all countries at all times. Given the importance of eco-
 nomic factors in determining diffusion rates, policies must
 take into careful consideration the country's development sta-
 tus in order to be effective.
 Some developed countries with an established computing
 industry are likely to need no special policies at all, or at best
 to need only a focused policy in the area of research and
 development or policies to ensure a "level playing field" in
 the global marketplace. Developing countries, however,
 might need to concentrate on building an infrastructure capa-
 ble of supporting information technology as economic devel-
 opment spurs diffusion. We believe our results fail to sup-
 port the arguments for either laissez innover or for targetted
 industrial policy as generally superior. Rather they indicate
 that government has an important role to play, especially
 through its macroeconomic policies. Targetted policies may
 have to be judged on narrower, often qualitative merits rather
 than in terms of overall computing diffusion.
 Kenneth L. Kraemer is a professor in the Graduate
 School of Management and the Department of Information
 and Computer Science at the University of California, Irvine,
 where he is also director of the Public Policy Research
 Organization. His most recent books are Datawars (1987),
 Wired Cities (1987), and Managing Information Systems
 (1989).
 John Leslie King is a professor in the Department of
 Information and Computer Science and the Graduate School
 of Management, University of California, Irvine. He is a co-
 author of the Dynamics of Computing (1985) and Datawars
 (1987) and Managing Information Systems (1989).
 Vijay Gurbaxani is an associate professor in the Graduate
 School of Management and the Department of Information
 and Computer Science at the University of California, Irvine.
 He is the author of Managing Information Systems Costs (ICIT
 Press, 1990). His most recent articles on information systems
 have appeared in Communications of the ACM and
 Information Systems Research.
 Notes
 Authors names are listed randomly to denote equal contribution. We are
 grateful for help from Jason Dedrick, Chet Newland, and four anonymous
 reviewers. This article is part of a study called "International Study of
 Government Policy and Information Technology in Asia-Pacific Countries,"
 supported by grants from the University of California's Pacific Rim Research
 Program and the National University of Singapore.
 1. At first glance, Australia should be included in the set of countries with
 a national computer plan, but it is not included because its national poli-
 cy was only announced in September 1987 and focused mainly on com-
 puter production rather than use. Therefore, it would have had little or
 no effect on the data used in this study. Australia has had piecemeal
 programs to promote computer production since 1977, but their effects
 have be n slight. Australia first announced a comprehensive Information
 Industries Strategy in 1987, which focuses on production rather than use
 (Dedrick and Kraemer, 1991).
 2. The data showing the fit of the exponential model are not included in
 this article but are presented in a technical appendix available from the
 authors. The fit is evidenced by the high values for the coefficient of
 determination, or the R2 term, and the t statistics corresponding to the
 coefficient estimates.
 3. Australia's growth rate is probably understated because of the unmea-
 sured products of a large pool of software development professionals
 who d velop software in-house. In spite of this, software purchases
 account for Australia's largest single component of growth.
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